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I. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
Foreign states are presumptively immune from suit, and their property presumptively
immune from attachment and execution, unless an exception in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA) applies.'
A. JURISDICTIONAL EXCEPTIONS
In OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that
in order for a suit to proceed under the § 1605(a)(2) exception for conduct "based upon a
commercial activity in the United States," the conduct must serve as the "gravamen" of
the suit.2 The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the "based upon"
requirement that instead asked whether the conduct was "an element" of each asserted
claim.3 The Court noted that such a test would "necessarily require[ ] a court to identify
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1. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq.
2. OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 136 S. Ct. 390, 395 (2015).
3. Id. at 395-96.
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all the elements of each claim" after conducting a "choice-of-law" analysis," and "would
allow plaintiffs to evade the [FSIA's] restrictions through artful pleading." 4
In Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the
D.C. Circuit held, in a 2-1 decision, that the takings exception in § 1605(a)(3) applied
when a Venezuelan subsidiary corporation alleged that Venezuela had "unreasonably
discriminated against it on the basis of [the] nationality" of its American parent.5 The
majority noted that the alleged discrimination excepted the case from the "domestic
takings rule," which generally bars a foreign corporation from "seek[ing] redress in an
American court for wrongs suffered in its home country."6 The court further held that,
notwithstanding that corporate law typically prohibits shareholders from enforcing a
corporation's rights, the parent had standing because § 1605(a)(3) requires only that
"rights in property . . . are in issue" and, under circuit precedent, shareholders may have
rights in corporate property.7
B. ATTACHMENT OR EXECUTION EXCEPTIONS
In Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that creditors who obtain default judgments against states designated as
terrorism sponsors need not serve those states with the judgments under § 1608(e) prior
to executing on their property.8 The court reasoned that while § 1610(c) explicitly
mandates § 1608(e) notice prior to execution against the property of states and their
instrumentalities under §§ 1610(a) and (b), it does not expressly require the same for
execution against the property of terrorism sponsors under § 1610(g). 9 The U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia subsequently rejected this holding in Owens v. Republic
of Sudan, where the court held that § 1610(g) is not a "freestanding immunity exception"
and that § 1610(c) does apply to terrorism-sponsor cases.10
C. ALTER EGO
In EM Ltd. v. Banco Central de La Repziblica Argentina, the Second Circuit rejected an
attempt to have the Central Bank of Argentina declared Argentina's alter ego and liable
for all its debts.ll Applying the United States Supreme Court's test from First National
City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba,12 the Second Circuit stated that as an
"instrumentality" under the FSIA, the Central Bank was jurisdictionally immune and
4. Id. at 396.
5. Helmerich & Payne Int'l Drilling Co. v. Venezuela, 784 F.3d 804, 812 (D.C. Cir. 2015), petition for cert.
filed, No. 15-698 (U.S. Nov. 27, 2015).
6. Id. at 812-14.
7. Id. at 814-16.
8. Wyattv. Syrian Arab Republic, 800 F.3d 331, 342-43 (7th Cir. 2015), petition forcert. filed, No. 15-1095
(U.S., Aug. 31, 2015).
9. Id.
10. Owens v. Republic of Sudan, Civ. Action No. 01-2244 (JDB), 2015 WL 6530582, at *3-4 (D.D.C. Oct.
28, 2015).
11. EM Ltd. v. Banco Central de la Republica Argentina, 800 F.3d 78, 89-96 (2d Cir. 2015), petition for cert.
filed No. 15-872 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2016).
12. First Nat'1 City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Banec), 462 U.S. 611, 629-30
(1983).
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separate from Argentina unless the plaintiffs showed that Argentina exercised "day-to-
day" control over its operations, or that recognizing its separateness would work a "fraud
or injustice."' 3 The court found plaintiffs' allegations insufficient to satisfy either prong,
emphasizing that close interaction concerning monetary policy is not enough for control
and that plaintiffs had not claimed that the Central Bank was used to frustrate collection
efforts or treated as a "sham" to hide assets.14
D. SERVICE OF PROCESS
The FSIA also governs service of process upon foreign states. In Barot v. Embassy of the
Republic of Zambia, the D.C. Circuit reversed a dismissal for failure to effect service after
the plaintiffs numerous unsuccessful attempts to comply with the requirements of
§ 1608(a).'s The court acknowledged that "strict adherence to 1608(a)" is necessary, but
noted that unlike the federal rules, the FSIA has no deadline to effect service, meaning
that there was still "a reasonable prospect that service [could] be maintained" and that
dismissal was inappropriate.1 6 In Harrison v. Republic of Sudan, examined in the following
section, the Second Circuit for the first time held that papers addressed to a minister of
foreign affairs but sent to a state's embassy in Washington, D.C., constitutes service under
§ 1608(a)(3).17
II. International Service of Process
International service of process is governed by Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 4(f) requires that the means of international service of process comport
with due process and not be prohibited by an international agreement.'
In Harrison v. Republic of Sudan, sailors injured during al Queda's bombing of the U.S.S.
Cole and their spouses sued Sudan, alleging that it provided material support for the
attack.1 9 When Sudan failed to appear, the plaintiffs obtained a default judgment and
were awarded over $300 million, but when the plaintiffs sought to enforce the judgment
against funds held by New York banks, Sudan opposed by arguing that plaintiffs' service of
process was flawed and therefore the default judgment lacked jurisdiction.20
As noted in the previous section, a foreign state can only be served with process in
accordance with the § 1608(a) of the FSIA. 2 1 The FSIA lists four methods of service in
preferential order, including "any special arrangement for service between the plaintiff
and the foreign state"; 22 any applicable international agreement or convention; 23 mailing
13. See EM Ltd. 800 F.3d at 91, 94-95.
14. Id. at 94, 96.
15. Barot v. Embassy of the Republic of Zambia, 785 F.3d 26, 28-30 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
16. Id. at 27, 29-30.
17. Harrison v. Republic of Sudan, 802 F.3d 399, 403-07 (2d Cir. 2015).
18. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(1) (an individual may be served outside of the United States "by any
internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice"); FED. R. Crv. P. 4(f)(3)
(allowing service "by other means not prohibited by international agreement").
19. Harrison, 802 F.3d at 400.
20. Id. at 401-02.
21. See supra Section I.D.
22. § 1608(a)(1).
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of the complaint and summons, along with a translation in the foreign state's official
language, to the "head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state";2 4 and, if none
of the other methods are available, then mailing of the complaint and summons to the
Director of Special Consular Services for transmission of the papers through diplomatic
channels.25
In Harrison, the plaintiffs argued that they successfully served process by mailing the
required documents, with the appropriate translations, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
via the Embassy of Sudan in Washington, D.C., while Sudan argued that the FSIA
required the plaintiffs to mail the documents to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in
Khartoum. 26 The court rejected Sudan's argument, noting that the FSIA "is silent as to a
specific location where the mailing is to be addressed." 27 After examining the legislative
history of the FSIA and the few district court opinions addressing this issue, the Second
Circuit concluded that the FSIA did not require mailing to the foreign state. 28 The court
also rejected Sudan's position as "mak[ing] little sense from a reliability perspective and as
a matter of policy," because "[w]hile direct mailing relies on the capacity of the foreign
postal service or a commercial carrier, mail addressed to an embassy-as an extension of
the foreign state-can be forwarded to the minister by diplomatic pouch." 29 The court
acknowledged that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations prohibits service of
process on an embassy or a diplomatic agent, but held that "[i]n a case where the suit is
not against the embassy or diplomatic agent, but against the foreign state with service on
the foreign minister via the embassy address, we do not see how principles of mission
inviolability and diplomatic immunity are implicated."30
III. Personal Jurisdiction
A. GENERAL JURISDICTION
In 2015, the federal courts of appeal consistently applied the Supreme Court's landmark
2014 decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, which held that general jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation is proper only when the corporation's affiliations with the forum state
are so "continuous and systematic" as to render it "essentially at home" in that state.3 '
Under Daimler, aside from the "exceptional" case, the paradigm forum for general
jurisdiction over a corporation is the defendant's place of incorporation and principal




26. Harrison, 802 F.3d at 403-04.
27. Id. at 404.
28. Id. at 406.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 405 (referring to Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, arts. 22(1), 31(1), Apr. 18, 1961,
500 U.N.T.S. 95).
31. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014).
32. Id. at 760-61, 761 n. 19.
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what would constitute an "exceptional case"; rather they have uniformly declined to
exercise general jurisdiction over defendants outside of Daimler's paradigmatic forums.3 3
Federal district courts in 2015 applied Daimler with less consistency. District courts
remain split on whether a defendant who is not "at home" in a forum state may
nonetheless consent to general jurisdiction under state long-arm provisions by complying
with the forum state's business registration statute. In AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan
Pharmaceuticals, LLC, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware wrote that, "[i]n
light of the holding in Daimler, [the defendant's] compliance with Delaware's registration
statutes-mandatory for doing business within the state-cannot constitute consent to
jurisdiction." 34 But in Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a different
judge on the same court held the opposite.35 Similarly, in Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.
v. Mylan Inc., the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey found that a
defendant had consented to personal jurisdiction by registering to do business in New
Jersey.36 Five months later, in McCourt v. A. 0. Smith Water Products Co., another judge on
that same court held the opposite.3 7
B. SPECIFIC JURISDICTION
With regard to specific personal jurisdiction, courts continue to grapple with the split in
authority on the necessary casual nexus between a plaintiffs cause of action and a
defendant's forum contacts required to support a finding of personal jurisdiction. In
Beydoun v. Wataniya Restaurants Holding, Q.S.C., a former employee alleged that the
defendant, his former employer, had recruited employees in, made business trips to, and
purchased equipment from the forum state of Michigan.3 8 The Sixth Circuit held that
although the employer's contacts with Michigan were sufficient to satisfy the long-arm
statute, the plaintiffs causes of action-for false imprisonment, abuse of process, and
malicious prosecution-did not proximately result from those contacts. 39 The Beydoun
court held that "more than mere but-for causation is required to support a finding of
personal jurisdiction."40 Conversely, in Cossart v. United Excel Corp., the First Circuit
expressly held that "in deciding [personal jurisdiction under the Massachusetts long-arm
statute] whether a claim 'arises from' a defendant's 'transacting business,' [a court] look[s]
33. See First Metro. Church of Hous. v. Genesis Grp., 616 F.App'x 148, 148-49 (5th Cir. 2015) (noting the
"difficult[y] ... [of] establish[ing] general jurisdiction in a forum other than the place of incorporation or
principal place of business"); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 135 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that
bank was "incorporated and headquartered elsewhere, [and] this [was] clearly not an exceptional case");
Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt., Inc., 789 F.3d 1201, 1204-05 (11th Cir. 2015); Kipp v. Ski Enter. Corp. of
Wis., Inc., 783 F.3d 695, 697-98 (7th Cir. 2015).
34. AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharm., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 555-56 (D. Del. 2014) (emphasis omitted) (Sleet,
J.).
35. See Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm., 78 F. Supp. 3d 572, 588-91 (D. Del. 2015) (Stark, J.).
36. Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Mylan Inc., 106 F.Supp.3d 456, 470-71 (D.NJ. 2015).
37. See McCourt v. A.O. Smith Water Prods. Co., Civ. Action No. 14-221, 2015 WL 4997403 (D.NJ.
Aug. 20, 2015).
38. Beydoun v. Wataniya Rests. Holding, Q.S.C., 768 F.3d 499, 507-08 (6th Cir. 2014).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 507.
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to see whether the transacted business was a 'but for' cause of the harm alleged in the
claim."4 1
Some circuits remain undecided. In Benson v. Rosenthal, a district court within the
Eastern District of Louisiana recognized that "[w]hile many circuits have expressly
adopted some variation of the [causal nexus] tests [for specific jurisdiction], the Fifth
Circuit has not." 42
C. IMPUTED JURISDICTION
Courts this year also worked to define the contours of imputed personal jurisdiction. In
Ranza v. Nike, Inc., the Ninth Circuit recognized a non-traditional approach to alter ego
jurisdiction.4 3 In Ranza, a United States citizen residing abroad brought an employment
action against her former employer, the Dutch subsidiary of an Oregon parent
corporation.4 4 Rather than seeking to impute a subsidiary's local contacts to a foreign
parent, "which is the traditional application of the alter ego test," the plaintiff in Ranza
sought to impute the local parent's contacts to the foreign subsidiary.45 Although the
court eventually found that the affiliated parties were not alter egos, it recognized the
viability of a reverse-piercing alter ego theory to extend personal jurisdiction to a foreign
subsidiary.46
IV. The Act of State Doctrine
The act of state doctrine is a prudential limitation on the exercise of judicial review. 47
The doctrine requires that "the acts of foreign sovereigns taken within their own
jurisdictions shall be deemed valid,"48 but does not apply when a court need not adjudicate
validity of foreign state's act.49
A. DEFINING FOREIGN STATE
In Ministry of Oil of Republic of Iraq v. 1,032,212 Barrels of Crude Oil Aboard United
Kalavrvta, Kurdistan sought dismissal under the act of state doctrine after Iraq's oil
ministry sued for alleged illegal seizure and conversion of Iraqi crude oil.s0 The U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Texas found that although Kurdistan, as a
political subdivision of the Republic of Iraq, was a state within the meaning of the FSIA, it
41. Cossart v. United Excel Corp., 804 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2015).
42. Benson v. Rosenthal, 116 F. Supp. 3d 702, 711 (E.D. La. 2015).
43. See Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 915 (2016).
44. Id., 793 F.3d at 1066-67.
45. Id. at 1071.
46. Id. at 1071-73.
47. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964); Credit Suisse v. U.S. Dist.
Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 130 F.3d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1997).
48. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int'l., 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990).
49. See, e.g., Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States, 786 F.3d 932, 955 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, No. 15-380,
2016 WL 854219 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2016).
50. Ministry of Oil of the Republic of Iraq v. 1,032,212 Barrels of Crude Oil Aboard the United Kalavrvta,
Civ. Action No. G-14-249, 2015 WL 93900, at *12 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2015), appeal dismissed as moot, No. 15-
40062 (5th Cir. Sept. 21, 2015).
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did not have the characteristics of a foreign state necessary to invoke the doctrine-most
importantly the capacity to conduct foreign relations." The court also found that policy
reasons underlying the doctrine did not support dismissal, noting in particular the lack of
any separation of powers concern and the fact that "'the current government of Iraq itself
has sought out United States courts,' a factor that 'tilt[s] against the doctrine's
application.' "52
B. DEFINING FOREIGN TERRITORY
In AdvanFort Co. v. International Registries, Inc., a United States federal district court
found that the act of state doctrine may bar claims based on acts occurring outside the
boundaries of the sovereign if they have effect solely within the state's sovereign
territory.5 3 The case concerned a claim against a Virginia company that administers the
maritime services of the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), based on the company's
emails implementing an RMI official's suspension order. 4 Because "the public act at
issue . . . was directed at and only had effect on RMI flagged ships, which are clearly
within RMI's territory," it met the threshold for act of state protection."
Similarly, in Hourani v. Mirtchev, the D.C. Circuit held that claims of defamation based
on statements made on the website of the Kazakh embassy in Washington, D.C. with the
active support of the Kazakh ambassador were subject to the act of state doctrine, stating
that an ambassador's statement on traditional subjects of sovereign and diplomatic
communication must be treated as being "formulated and dictated from within its own
territory."56
C. EXTRATERRITORIAL RECOGNITION
The court in Mezerhane v. Repziblica Bolivariana de Venezuela57 from the Eleventh
Circuit, and Yale University v. Konowaloff from the Second Circuit, reaffirmed that the
doctrine precludes adjudicating the validity of a foreign state's confiscation of its citizens'
property within its own borders.
Two district courts reached different results on the question of recognizing Cuban
expropriation decrees regarding property in the United States so as to allow judgment
creditors of Cuba to execute on the property. In Villoldo v. Ruz, the court declined to
allow execution because taking the property from the rightful, but unknown, owners
would not be "consistent with the policy and law of the United States,"5 9 whereas in
51. Id. at *12-13.
52. Id. at *13 (quoting Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, 920 F. Supp. 2d 517, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)).
53. AdvanFort Co. v. Int'l Registries, Inc., Civ. Action No. 1:15-CV-220, 2015 WL 4254988, at *7 (E.D.
Va. July 13, 2015).
54. Id. at *1-2.
55. Id. at *7. The court reserved decision on whether to dismiss pursuant to the doctrine until it could
potentially seek the views of the U.S. Department of State. Id. at *8.
56. Hourani v. Mirtchev, 796 F.3d 1, 11-12, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
57. Mezerhane v. Rep1blica Bolivariana de Venezuela, 785 F.3d 545, 552 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied 136
S.Ct. 800 (2016).
58. Yale Univ. v. Konowaloff, 620 Fed. Appx. 60, 61(2d Cir. 2015).
59. Villoldo v. Ruz, 113 F. Supp. 3d 435, 439, 442-43 (D. Mass. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-1808, No.
15-2080 (1st Cir. Sept. 24, 2015).
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Hausler v. ]P Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., the court found execution to be consistent with
United States policy because it would result in compensation of terror victims and the
property would otherwise likely escheat to the State of New York.60
Finally, in Federal Treasury Enterprise Sojuzplodoimport v. Spirits International B. V., the
Second Circuit held that because a foreign governmental decree assigning all interests in a
U.S. trademark "was a wholly intragovernmental transfer of rights" that did not purport
to alter anyone else's rights or interests, and addressed "a question of Russian law decided
within Russia's borders, rather than a matter of U.S. law with a situs in the United States,"
the decree was a sovereign (and not commercial) act whose validity cannot be questioned
in a U.S. court.6 1
V. International Discovery
A. OBTAINING UNITED STATES DISCOVERY FOR USE IN FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS
In 2015, United States courts addressed the requirements for obtaining discovery for
use in proceedings before foreign or international tribunals, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782(a)62 and under the factors set out in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. 63
Several courts interpreted the statutory requirement that the discovery be "for use" in a
foreign proceeding. In Mees v. Buiter, the Second Circuit held that the requested
discovery need not be "necessary" for success in the foreign proceeding, so long as it
would provide "some advantage." 64 But in Certain Funds, Accounts and/or Inv. Vehicles v.
KPMG, the Second Circuit found that where the requesting party has no "role in the
proceeding" beyond a mere "ability to pass on information," it cannot satisfy this "for use"
requirement.6 s
Two courts addressed the scope of what may count as a "proceeding before a foreign
tribunal." 66 In Akebia Therapeutics v. Fibrogen, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
European and Japanese Patent Offices were foreign "tribunals" because both offices
conduct "quasi-judicial proceedings." 67 By contrast, the Southern District of New York in
Jiangsu Steamship Co. v. Success Superior Ltd., held that a party's claim that the discovery
would be of use in "unspecified foreign attachment proceedings" was insufficient, both
because the party failed to show that such proceedings were "reasonably contemplates"
and because pre-judgment attachment proceedings would not be "adjudicative" in
60. Hausler v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 127 F. Supp. 3d 17, 56-57 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
61. Fed. Treasury Enter. Sojuzplodoimport, OAO v. Spirits Int'l B.V., 809 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2016),
rev'g 61 F.Supp. 3d 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
62. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) ("The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may
order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding
in a foreign or international tribunal.").
63. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 243 (2004). In Intel, the Supreme Court
noted three statutory requirements for invoking § 1782(a) and articulated four discretionary factors courts
should consider. Id. at 244-45.
64. Mees v. Buiter, 793 F.3d 291, 298 (2d Cir. 2015).
65. Certain Funds, Accounts, and/or Inv. Vehicles v. KPMG, L.L.P., 798 F.3d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 2015).
66. See § 1782(a).
67. Akebia Therapeutics, Inc. v. Fibrogen, Inc., 793 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2015).
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nature.68 The court emphasized that it would be illegitimate for a party to use § 1782 to
"troll[] for assets in U.S. institutions in order to decide whether it is worth [its] while to
commence [a foreign merits proceeding] in the first place," and a "subterfuge" to use
§ 1782 to obtain discovery with an eye toward eventually "initiating pre-judgment
attachment proceedings in the United States, rather than a foreign tribunal."69
In In re Republic of Kazakhstan, the Southern District of New York held that a foreign
sovereign could be an "interested person" for purposes of the statute, in part because the
goal of the statute was to "encourage reciprocity by foreign governments." 70 The court
also held that because the respondent London-based law firm "operate[d] as a single law
firm" with its New York office, the firm could be "'found' [in New York] for purposes of
section 1782" and the documents could be sought.71
B. OBTAINING DISCOVERY FROM ABROAD FOR USE IN UNITED STATES
PROCEEDINGS
In 2015, United States courts considered the discretionary factors in Societe Nationale
Industrielle Airospatiale v. U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa in evaluating
discovery requests for information located in foreign jurisdictions for use in U.S.
proceedings. 72
In Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, the Southern District of New York considered requests
for materials located in several different countries, and focused on the extent to which the
foreign jurisdictions had historically enforced blocking statutes or secrecy laws.73 The
court found that France's blocking statute is "riddled with loopholes" and "substantially
unenforceable."74 Similarly, the court found a "total paucity of published prosecutions of
banks or their officers in Jordan and the UAE."71 By contrast, the court determined that
Switzerland's secrecy regime was "seriously enforced" and refused to order discovery.76
Apart from national secrecy laws, European authorities can be expected to strictly
enforce data protection laws, including as to United States-style discovery requests.
Notably, an impending EU regulation, the General Data Protection Regulation, proposes
a sharp increase in fines for violations of data protection laws, while the Court of Justice of
68. Jiangsu Steamship Co. v. Success Superior Ltd., No. 14 Civ. 9997 (CM), 2015 WIL 3439220 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 5, 2015). See also Certain Funds, 798 F.3d at 123 (affirming that the foreign proceedings "must be within
reasonable contemplation") (emphasis original).
69. Jiangsu Steamship Co., 2015 WL 3439220, at *5.
70. In re Republic of Kazakhstan, 110 F. Supp. 3d 512, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
71. Id. at 515.
72. Societe Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for So. Dist. Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 539
(1987).
73. Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 73 F. Supp. 3d 397, 403 (S.D.N.Y 2014).
74. Id. Similarly, in In re Cathode Ray Tube (CR) Antitrust Litigation, the court found that France's
blocking statute posed no "realistic risk of prosecution" and therefore ordered discovery. In re Cathode Ray
Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litigation, Case No. C-07-5944-SC, 2014 WL 5462496, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23,
2014).
75. Motorola Credit Corp., 73 F.Supp. 3d at 405.
76. Id. at 404.
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the EU recently emphasized the independent power of national data protection agencies
to enforce European data protection laws.7 7
VI. Extraterritorial Application of United States Law
A. RICO
In a closely watched case, the United States Supreme Court is set to consider the
extraterritoriality of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). In
European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., in which the European Community and its
member states alleged violations of RICO through predicate acts of money laundering,
the district court in New York first dismissed the case after finding that the Supreme
Court's decision in Morrison v. NationalAustralia Bank7 8 precluded RICO's extraterritorial
application.79 The Second Circuit reversed, distinguishing its own precedent in Norex
Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Industries, Inc.,so and held that RICO applies extraterritorially
whenever the RICO claim "depends on violations of a predicate statute that manifests an
unmistakable congressional intent to apply extraterritorially."81 The Second Circuit then
refused to rehear the case en banc, over the dissents of five judges who argued that the
panel decision was irreconcilable with both Morrison and Norex.8 2 Those dissenting
argued that Congress did not intend RICO to apply extraterritorially and that the panel
decision would invite just the kind of extraterritorial civil litigation that the Supreme
Court has foreclosed not just with Morrison, but also with Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co.83
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and its forthcoming decision can be expected to
provide important clarification not just for the extraterritorial reach of RICO, if any, but
also for the Court's extraterritoriality jurisprudence more broadly.84
B. FOURTH AND FTH AMENDMENTS
In Hernandez v. United States, the Fifth Circuit reconsidered en banc allegations of
Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations based on a shooting of a Mexican teenager
located on the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexico border by a United States Border Patrol
77. See Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Protection Comm'r, INEOCURIA (Oct. 6, 2015), http://
curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsflnum=C-362/14; Cecilia Alvarez et al., Into The Unknown - The Proposed EU
General Data Protection Regulation and Its Potential Effect on Transborder Data Flows, BLOOMBERG BNA:
DiGTAL DISCovERY & E-EvIDENCE (2015), http://www.promontory.com/uploadedFiles/Articles/Insights/
150715_BloombergBNAEUGDPR.pdf.
78. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
79. European Cmty v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-CV-5771 (NGG)(VVP), 2011 WIL 843957 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 8, 2011).
80. Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Industries, Inc., 631 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2010).
81. European Cmty v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 764 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 2014) (analyzed in last year's Year in
Review).
82. European Cmty v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 783 F.3d 123, 127-137 (2d Cir. 2015) (dissents by Cabranes,
Raggi, Jacobs, Livingston, and Lynch).
83. See id. at 129-30 (Cabranes, J. dissenting) (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct.
1659 (2013); Morrison, 561 U.S. 247).
84. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 28 (Mem.) (2015).
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agent standing on the United States side.8 The original panel held that the teenager did
not have "sufficient voluntary connections" with the United States to invoke the Fourth
Amendment, but that Fifth Amendment protections did apply extraterritorially.86 In its en
banc decision, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed that the Mexican teenager lacked Fourth
Amendment rights, but decided against the Fifth Amendment claim by finding that the
border patrol officer was entitled to qualified immunity because the asserted constitutional
right was, at minimum, not clearly established.87 "No case law in 2010, when this episode
occurred, reasonably warned Agent Mesa that his conduct violated the Fifth
Amendment."" The court concluded by noting that "[r]easonable minds can differ on
whether Boumediene may someday be explicitly extended as the plaintiffs urge." 8 9
The per curiam opinion in Hernandez masked deep divisions on the court, which
generated five separate concurring opinions. Four judges would have squarely held that
United States constitutional rights do not extend to aliens who lack connection to the
United States and are injured on foreign soil.90 Other judges criticized that analysis as
contrary to precedent established by the Supreme Court. 9 1 As of this writing, the plaintiff
has filed a petition for certiorari which has been supported by numerous groups of amici
curiae, and the Supreme Court has called for the views of the Solicitor General, raising
the possibility that it will hear the case and clarify the extraterritoriality analysis under
Boumediene.92
VII. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
In United States courts, the U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitration Awards, otherwise known as the "New York Convention," governs the
recognition and enforcement of most foreign arbitral awards. 93 State law, however,
governs the recognition and enforcement of foreign court judgments.
85. Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2014) rev'd en banc, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015).
Last year's Year in Review discussed the original Fifth Circuit panel decision.
86. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 268 (applying "objective factors and practical concerns" drawn from Boumediene
v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), including the extent of control exercised by the United States over the border
area).
87. Hernandez, 785 F.3d at 119-21.
88. Id. at 120.
89. Id. at 121.
90. See id. at 121-22 (Jones,J., concurring).
91. Id. at 133-38 (Prado, J., concurring).
92. Hernandez v. Mesa, No. 15-118, 84 USLW 3060 (July 23, 2015); see also Hernandez v. Mesa,
SCOTUSBlog, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/hernandez-v-mesa/ (last visted Apr. 11, 2016).
93. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,21 U.S.T.
2517 [hereinafter New York Convention]. The Convention is implemented in U.S. law through Chapter 2 of
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (2013). The Inter-American Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, S. Treaty Doc. No. 97-12, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42; governs
the recognition and enforcement of awards if a majority of the parties to an arbitration agreement are citizens
of states that have ratified it. The Inter-American Convention is implemented in Chapter 3 of the FAA. 9
U.S.C. §§ 301-07.
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A. FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
In Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, the D.C. Circuit held that the deference courts must give to
arbitrators regarding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the issue at hand may not be
circumvented in actions against foreign states via the FSIA's jurisdictional inquiry.94
Ecuador had argued that the question of arbitration required de novo review because, if
Ecuador had not agreed to arbitrate, the district court lacked jurisdiction over it under the
FSIA.95 The D.C. Circuit disagreed, noting that "Ecuador conflate[d] the jurisdictional
standard of the FSIA with the standard of review under the New York Convention," which
"affords the district court little discretion in refusing or deferring enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards." 96
In Belize Social Development Limited v. Government ofBelize, the D.C. Circuit held that in
order to satisfy the requirement of the New York Convention, an arbitral award must
"arise from a commercial transaction," and the award need only have a "connection to
commerce."
97 The court found that the meaning of "commercial" was to be found in
both the Restatement on International Commercial Arbitration, as well as Supreme Court
precedent interpreting the Commerce Clause, not the far narrower definition of
"commercial" applied in the context of the ESIA, which distinguishes between foreign
states' "sovereign" and "commercial" acts.9 8 The court based its reasoning on the fact
that, unlike the FSIA, the New York Convention did not codify the restrictive theory of
foreign sovereign immunity. 99
In Asignacion v. Rickmers Genoa Schi/ffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Cie KG, the Fifth Circuit
considered a lower court order refusing to enforce an arbitral award that applied
Philippine law (in accordance with the contract) to award damages of less than $2,000 to a
seriously injured plaintiff, on the grounds that such enforcement would be contrary to
United States public policy.10 0 The court reversed, explaining that there was "no evidence
that the . . . award was inadequate relative to [the plaintiffs] unmet medical needs, let
alone so inadequate as to violate this nation's 'most basic notions of morality and justice,'"
and that as a general matter courts "should be reluctant to conclude that lesser remedies
make an award unenforceable on policy grounds."' 0 The court observed that some
choice of law provisions may unenforceable when they are an attempt by a party to "avoid
applicable law," but in the case at hand, the provision was "mandated by a foreign
sovereign rather than a party to the contract."1 02
94. Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, 795 F.3d 200, 204-06 (D.C. Cir 2015), petition for cert. filed, No. 15-1088,
84 USLW 3502 (Feb. 25, 2016).
95. Id. at 204.
96. Id. at 204, 207.
97. Belize Soc. Dev. Ltd. v. Gov't of Belize, 794 F.3d 99, 103-05 (D.C. Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, No.
15-830, 84 USLW 3361 (Dec. 22, 2015).
98. Id. at 103-04 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF U.S. LAW OF COMM. ARBITRATION § 1-1 (AM. LAW
INST. 2012); Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003)).
99. Id. at 104-05
100. Asignaciaon v. Rickmers Genoa Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MBH & CIE KG, 783 F.3d 1010, 1017-19 (5th
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 795 (2016).
101. Id. at 1020.
102. Id. at 1018-19.
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B. FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS
In Dejoria v. Maghreb Petroleum Exploration, S.A., the Fifth Circuit reversed an order
finding that, under the Texas Recognition Act, a Moroccan court judgment was
unenforceable on the ground that the Moroccan judicial system does not provide due
process. 0 3 The court acknowledged that evidence suggested that Moroccan judges lack
independence from the executive monarchy, but found that the plaintiff did not meet high
burden of showing that the "judicial system lacks sufficient independence such that fair
litigation in Morocco is impossible."104 The court compared the case with prior United
States court decisions finding insufficient due process available in the courts of Iran and
war-torn Liberia, noting that those systems were "so fundamentally flawed as to offend
basic notions of fairness."10 The court also rejected the argument that the judgment was
unenforceable because the Moroccan court lacked personal jurisdiction due to the
plaintiffs failure to effect service, and instead focused on the fact that the defendant had
actual notice of the underlying suit. 06
VIII. Forum Non Conveniens
A. FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES
In Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court fr the Western District of Texas,
the Supreme Court held that a forum selection clause should be analyzed under the
doctrine of frum non conveniens and described specifically how the parties' agreement
should inform the traditional forum non conveniens analysis.107 Atlantic Marine was a two-
party dispute, but in a pair of decisions the Fifth Circuit analyzed how Atlantic Marine
should apply to multiparty cases.
In In re Lloyd's Register North America, Inc., the Fifth Circuit held that Atlantic Marine
applies even when a non-signatory to a forum selection clause is bound to a contract under
the direct-estoppel doctrine. 08 The litigation arose out of a ship that Irving Shipbuilding
(Irving) was building for Pearl Seas Cruises (Pearl).1 09 Lloyd's Register North America
(LRNA) was responsible for certifying that the ship was built according to technical
standards of construction." 0 Dissatisfied, Pearl sued Irving, pursuing years of litigation
and arbitration until it eventually settled; then, Pearl sued the LRNA, arguing that the
LRNA misrepresented the status of the ship to Pearl and the arbitrators."' LRNA moved
to dismiss on frum non conveniens grounds because its contract with Irving and its register
103. DeJoria v. Maghreb Petroleum Expl., S.A., 804 F.3d 373, 380-83 (5th Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed,
No. 15-1033, 84 USLW 3451 (Feb. 16, 2016).
104. Id. at 380-82.
105. Id. at 381-83.
106. Id. at 386-89.
107. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. Tex., 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013).
108. In re Lloyd's Register N. Am., Inc., 780 F.3d 283, 294 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Pearl Seas
Cruises, LLC v. Lloyd's Register N. Am., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 64 (2015).
109. Id. at 2 86.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 286-87.
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of rules required claims to be brought in England.11 2 The district court denied the
motion to dismiss without explanation.11 3
On LRNA's petition for writ of mandamus, the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding first that
the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss without explanation and neglect to
balance the relevant frum non conveniens factors constituted an abuse of discretion.11 4
Second, the Fifth Circuit found that direct-benefits estoppel bound Pearl to the forum
selection clause contained in the contract between LRNA and Irving, even though Pearl
was not a signatory to that contract, because Pearl "knew about the contract between
Irving and LRNA, acted to exploit it, and gained a benefit from it."115 Finding that the
forum selection clause applied to Pearl, the court then turned to the Atlantic Marine
analysis.116 Weighing the private interest factors in favor of dismissal given the forum
selection clause, the Fifth Circuit held that Pearl had not proven this to be one of the
unusual cases in which the public interest factors outweigh the choice of a valid forum-
selection clause.117
In re Rolls Royce Corp. arose with the failure of an engine bearing in a helicopter owned
by Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. (PHI)."8 The failed bearing caused the helicopter's pilot
to make an emergency water landing, which involved inflating the pontoons.119
Subsequently, a pontoon failed and the helicopter flipped, totaling the helicopter.120 PHI
sued three parties: Rolls Royce, which designed and manufactured the engine bearing; the
designer, manufacturer, and seller of the pontoons; and the company that repaired the
pontoons before the crash.1 2 1
The district court denied Rolls Royce's motion to sever and transfer the claims against
it to the Southern District of Indiana, based on a forum selection clause in its contract
with PHI.122 On Rolls Royce's petition for writ of mandamus, the Fifth Circuit reversed
holding that the district court had erred in light of Atlantic Marine; however, it made clear
that it did not read Atlantic Marine to require severance and transfer in all multiparty cases
where only some of the parties are subject to a forum selection clause.1 2 3 Rather, the Fifth
Circuit developed a balancing test for cases like Rolls Royce, wherein the court should
weigh the private factors of those parties who did enter into a forum selection clause
entirely in favor of severance and transfer, while considering the private factors of those
parties who did not agreed to a forum selection clause under the normal severance and
§ 1404 transfer analysis.124 Finally, the court should determine whether the balance of
private factors is outweighed by "the judicial economy considerations of having all claims
112. Id. at 287.
113. Id.
114. In re Lloyd's, 780 F.3d at 290.
115. Id. at 291.
116. Id. at 293-94.
117. Id.
118. In re Rolls Royce Corp., 775 F.3d 671, 674 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. deniedbsu nom. PHI Inc. v. Rolls Royce
Corp., 136 S. Ct. 45 (2015).




123. Id. at 677-78.
124. In re Rolls Royce Corp., 775 F.3d at 681.
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determined in a single lawsuit."1 25 Whether a forum selection clause selecting a foreign
jurisdiction changes the balance of these factors, given unique challenges presented when
not all parties agreed to the foreign jurisdiction, remains to be seen.
IX. Parallel Proceedings
A. INTERNATIONAL ABSTENTION
Federal district courts entertained requests to stay United States litigation in deference
to ongoing foreign litigation-an exception to the courts' otherwise "unflagging"
obligation to hear and decide a case that falls within its jurisdiction.1 26 In general
litigation, courts applied the Colorado River doctrine: a "two-step analysis" looking first to
"whether the two proceedings are parallel" and, second, a set of discretionary factors.127
Several decisions reflected recognition that "[p]arallelism is not a formulaic
requirement" and "exact parallelism is not required."12 8 In Glock v. Glock, the court stayed
a RICO suit brought against Glock KG and its founder by the founder's ex-wife without
engaging in much analysis of the similarity of the claims to previously-filed claims in
Austria, but rather looking broadly at three discretionary factors: "(1) judicial efficiency,
(2) international comity, and (3) fairness."129 In Detroit International Bridge Company v.
Canada, the court stayed litigation by an alleged franchisee claiming an exclusive right to
build a bridge between Detroit and Windsor, Canada, finding that although the
defendants in the United States action (the Government of Canada and a Canadian public
authority) and parallel Canadian action (the Canadian Attorney General) were different,
they were "similar" for abstention purposes.1 30 The court also emphasized Canada's
"paramount interest in adjudicating this dispute."' 3 ' Regarding the timing of the suits,
the court in AT&T Management Services, L.P. v. CRI Consultants Ltd., stayed what it called
an "anticipatory" declaratory judgment action filed after the plaintiff had received demand
letters that led to a later-filed English lawsuit.132
In the bankruptcy context, courts seemed more resistant to abstention, despite the
express discretion afforded them under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) to abstain "in the interest
of justice." Both the Fifth Circuit and the bankruptcy court for the S.D.N.Y held that this
discretion was simply not available in Chapter 15 cases, i.e. petitions filed ancillary to a
primary proceeding in another country, notwithstanding the concerns of piecemeal
125. Id.
126. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).
127. See, e.g., AEP Indus., Inc. v. UTECO N. Am., Inc., No. 1:14-CV-96-GNS, 2015 WL 1298556, at *6
(W.D. Ky. Mar. 23, 2015).
128. Id. (The district court declined to abstain because "[d]espite the common facts and causes of action in
the two suits, differing plaintiffs and theories of recovery lead this Court to conclude the actions are not
parallel.").
129. Glock v. Glock, Civ. Action File No. 1:14-CV-3249-TWT, 2015 WL 3843288, at *2 (N.D. Ga. June
19, 2015).
130. Detroit Int'l Bridge Co. v. Gov't of Canada, 78 F. Supp. 3d 117, 121 (D.D.C. 2015).
131. Id. at 122 (internal quotations omitted).
132. AT&T Mgmt. Servs., LP v. CRI Consultants Ltd., Civ. Action No. 3:15-CV-0073-B, 2015 WL
4743376, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2015).
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litigation and inefficiencies put forward by the stay-seeking parties in those cases.133 And
in In re Northshore Mainland Services, Inc., the federal bankruptcy court in Delaware
considered a petition filed by a U.S. entity along with several Bahamian partners
developing "one of the most significant single-phase resorts currently under development
in the western hemisphere," that was expected to eventually "generate nearly 5,000 jobs
and . . . representing 12% of the GDP of The Bahamas."1 34 Simultaneous with its
Delaware filing, Northshore petitioned the Bahamian Supreme Court to recognize the
U.S. filing and stay all related legal proceedings in The Bahamas.' 35 Bahamian authorities
soon began their own insolvency proceedings and the Bahamian Supreme Court rejected
the petition, stating that the "only insolvency proceedings which can give true effect to the
principal of modified universality would be a unitary insolvency proceedings in The
Bahamas."1 36 In response, while the Delaware court "acknowledge[d] the deep and
important economic interest of the Government of The Bahamas in the future of the
Project," it held that that interest "is no more important than the right of a company
incorporated in the United States to have recourse to relief in a United States Bankruptcy
Court." 37 It thus dismissed the Bahamian partner entities-but retained the insolvency
of Northshore.
B. ANTI-suIT INJUNCTIONS
Federal district courts also entertained numerous requests to enjoin the pursuit of
foreign litigation, applying a variety of similar tests drawn from leading cases in the
various circuits. Here, courts showed much more exacting demands of parallelism. While
noting that "the claims at issue in the foreign and local proceedings do not have to be
precisely and verbally identical," the court in Nike, Inc. v. Cardarelli refused to enjoin,
noting that the parallel Italian action including wrongful termination claims not at issue in
the Oregon stock option-based litigation, and, independently, because two of the seven
years of stock option agreements at issue in the case did not have a forum selection clause
in favor of Oregon, the court could not enjoin their adjudication in Italy. 3 s In Vringo, Inc.
v. ZTE Corp., a court hearing a case alleging improper use of materials protected by a non-
disclosure agreement agreed to enjoin the defendant's further use of those materials, but
found it could not enjoin defendant's Chinese antitrust case against the United States
plaintiff that used the materials, because resolution of the NDA claims would not actually
resolve the antitrust claims.139 But in APR Energy, LLC v. First Investment Group Corp., the
court, after granting the plaintiffs motion to compel arbitration, determined that a
defendant's claim in a parallel Libyan proceeding was arbitrable and thus that disposition
133. See Firefighters' Ret. Sys. v. Citco Grp. Ltd., 796 F.3d 520, 528 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
896 (2016); In re Hellas Telecomms. (Lux.) II SCA, 535 B.R. 543, 587-89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015).
134. In re Northshore Mainland Sers., Inc., 537 B.R. 192, 196 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015).
135. Id. at 197.
136. Id. at 198.
137. Id. at 205-06.
138. Nike, Inc. v. Cardarelli, No. 3:14-CV-01690-BR, 2015 WL 853008, at *4 (D. Or. Feb. 26, 2015).
139. Vringo, Inc. v. ZTE Corp., No. 14-Cv-4988 (LAK), 2015 WIL 3498634, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 3,
2015).
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in favor of arbitration would fully dispose of the Libyan proceeding even though the
Libyan claim was not raised in the United States action.1 4 0
In an interesting case, the federal bankruptcy court in New York applied the foreign
litigation antisuit analysis to enjoin a beis din Jewish religious court proceeding invoked by
an adversary of the debtor subsequent to the debtor's Chapter 11 filing.141 The beis din
actually issued its own equivalent of an antisuit injunction-an ekul-against the debtor,
threatening it with a sirov, or shunning by members of the religious community and
potentially all Orthodox Jews, if it continued adversary proceedings in bankruptcy.1 42
After finding that application of the federal bankruptcy automatic stay did not violate the
Free Exercise or Establishment Clauses of the United States Constitution, the bankruptcy
court not only enjoined the beis din but imposed coercive sanctions of $10,000 a day until
the school and persons who invoked the beis din requested that it cease and that the ekul be
vacated.143
140. APR Energy, LLC v. First Inv. Grp Corp., 88 F. Supp. 3d 1300, 1321 (M.D. Fla. 2015), aff'g on
reconsideration 2015 WL 736236 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 20, 2015). See also Interdigital Tech. Corp. v. Pegatron
Corp., 2015 WL 3958257 (N.D. Cal.june 29, 2015) (enjoining a subsequent action in Taiwan's Intellectual
Property Court filed by Taiwanese defendant against Pennsylvania plaintiff).
141. In re Congregation Birchos Yosef, 535 B.R. 629, 632 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015).
142. Id. at 631-32.
143. Id. at 639.
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